{"id":21476,"date":"2025-05-09T12:31:52","date_gmt":"2025-05-09T07:31:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cissajk.org.pk\/?p=21476"},"modified":"2025-06-10T08:01:27","modified_gmt":"2025-06-10T08:01:27","slug":"sindoor-to-strategic-folly-indias-risky-escalation-doctrine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=21476","title":{"rendered":"Sindoor to Strategic Folly: India\u2019s Risky Escalation Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-post\" data-elementor-id=\"21476\" class=\"elementor elementor-21476\" data-elementor-post-type=\"post\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"penci-section penci-disSticky penci-structure-10 elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-6c6a9a28 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"6c6a9a28\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"penci-ercol-100 penci-ercol-order-1 penci-sticky-ct    elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-7a8a61f6\" data-id=\"7a8a61f6\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5407a7c6 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"5407a7c6\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p>India\u2019s recent cross-border strikes under Operation Sindoor, and the attempt to reframe them as a new counter-terrorism doctrine, may excite hawks and domestic audiences. But beneath the surface, this shift marks a dangerous deviation from established norms of state behavior and strategic prudence.<br \/>In his commentary on the operation, Indian analyst Happymon Jacob describes a confident India that is \u201cdone with strategic restraint\u201d and now willing to strike at will. But this interpretation masks a troubling escalation pattern rooted in unverified claims, legal distortions, and a misreading of nuclear deterrence dynamics. Sindoor does not signify strategic clarity; it exemplifies reckless overreach.<\/p><p><strong>False Flags and Manufactured Pretexts<\/strong><br \/>The April 22 incident in Pahalgam \u2014 a remote and highly secured area \u2014 was swiftly blamed on Pakistan. Attribution preceded any investigation. Within hours, airstrikes followed. This is not unfamiliar territory.<br \/>India has a documented history of leveraging ambiguous crises as casus belli. The 1995 Al-Faran kidnappings, explored in Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark\u2019s The Meadow, raised serious concerns about internal orchestration. More recently, Pulwama (2019) and Pathankot (2016) showed how attribution can become a tool of narrative, not a product of evidence.<br \/>India\u2019s bypassing of multilateral mechanisms, such as joint investigations or diplomatic protest via the Indus Waters Treaty framework, reinforces this pattern. \u201cAct first, justify later\u201d is a dangerous doctrine \u2014 and one that sets troubling precedents for other nuclear-armed regions.<br \/><strong>Weaponizing Self-Defence: Legal Myopia<\/strong><br \/>India claims its strikes are justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter \u2014 the right to self-defence. But international law demands that such force meet strict tests: necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.<br \/>None of these thresholds were met. There was no imminent threat; no necessity that could not be addressed through diplomacy; and certainly no proportionality in targeting civilian infrastructure, such as the Neelum\u2013Jhelum Hydropower Project \u2014 a site protected under Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.<br \/>Normalizing pre-emptive force on the basis of perceived terrorist threats risks rendering the international legal order moot. Were Pakistan to follow such doctrine, it would be justified in targeting RSS-linked infrastructure following attacks like the Jaffar Express bombing in Balochistan. Would India and its partners find such logic acceptable?<br \/><strong>A Doctrine of Precedents, Not Principles<\/strong><br \/>Operation Sindoor appears to be part of a carefully sequenced doctrine of escalation:<br \/>1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Trigger a crisis, typically with unverifiable attacks.<br \/>2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Impute blame to Pakistan without presenting actionable evidence.<br \/>3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Conduct military strikes, including in disputed or sovereign Pakistani territory.<br \/>4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Invoke self-defence, side-stepping international scrutiny.<br \/>5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Claim restraint, even as strategic norms are eroded.<br \/>This is not a doctrine of deterrence \u2014 it is a doctrine of manipulation. It seeks to redefine rules of engagement not through international consensus, but by setting de facto precedents. For New Delhi, being judge, jury, and executioner in such crises creates temporary tactical advantage. But this short-term gain masks long-term strategic peril.<br \/><strong>Deterrence Misunderstood<\/strong><br \/>One of Jacob\u2019s most problematic assertions is that India has \u201ccalled Pakistan\u2019s nuclear bluff.\u201d This interpretation dangerously misreads the function of deterrence. Pakistan\u2019s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine is calibrated. As Pakistan\u2019s response during 2019 Kashmir crisis affirmed, FSD\u2019s strength lies in ensuring that India\u2019s ambitions to wage limited war do not succeed. Pakistan\u2019s restraint following provocations is a mark of discipline, not weakness.<br \/>India\u2019s repeated escalations have not gone unanswered. After Pulwama, Pakistan\u2019s Quid Pro Quo Plus (QPQ+) response \u2014 downing Indian aircraft and capturing a pilot \u2014 proved its resolve. That similar actions have not yet followed Sindoor does not suggest absence of will, but the presence of strategic calculation.<br \/>The notion that deterrence has failed because it has not produced war is not only paradoxical \u2014 it is dangerous.<br \/><strong>Why the World Should Be Concerned<\/strong><br \/>Jacob frames Sindoor as a moment of choice for the international community: stand with India or lose relevance in Delhi. This is not diplomacy \u2014 it is coercion. The implication is clear: criticism of India\u2019s methods is tantamount to sympathizing with terrorism.<br \/>This absolutism is antithetical to international norms. If Sindoor is accepted as a precedent, other states may follow suit, citing unverified threats to justify force. The erosion of norms will not end at the Line of Control. It will travel globally.<br \/>The fact that Israeli drones were used in some of these strikes also introduces a dangerous geopolitical layer \u2014 the blending of external technologies and domestic narratives to justify escalation. This globalizes what has traditionally been seen as a bilateral issue, and invites international entanglement in regional conflicts.<br \/><strong>Pakistan\u2019s Posture: Measured, Not Passive<\/strong><br \/>Pakistan\u2019s doctrine has never precluded response. It chooses its timing with care, not because of weakness, but because of its responsibility as a nuclear state. A visible, proportionate response may yet come \u2014 calibrated to restore balance without crossing escalation thresholds.<\/p><p>Unlike India, Pakistan has no interest in turning military retaliation into media spectacle. But no doctrine can succeed indefinitely if provocation becomes policy. The strategic space for Pakistan\u2019s response remains open \u2014 and may soon be tested.<br \/><strong>Conclusion: The Folly of Sindoor<\/strong><br \/>Operation Sindoor is not a new doctrine \u2014 it is an old mistake repackaged. It is the belief that short-term tactical aggression can deliver long-term strategic security. History, both regional and global, shows otherwise.<br \/>If India truly seeks peace and recognition as a responsible power, it must abandon this playbook of coercion. Power is not measured by the distance of a strike, but by the wisdom of restraint. Strategic maturity lies not in military adventurism, but in resolving disputes that fuel perpetual crisis.<br \/>For Pakistan, the lesson is simple: restraint is strength \u2014 but restraint must not become irrelevance. And for the world: don\u2019t mistake silence for surrender. The region\u2019s stability depends on rejecting doctrines like Sindoor before they become global norms.<br \/>India\u2019s incursions have so far been absorbed by Pakistan \u2014 but to assume this restraint is infinite is a miscalculation. The absence of nuclear use in past crises does not invalidate deterrence; it confirms that escalation was, so far, contained.<br \/>Deterrence is about credibility \u2014 and credibility is not performative. The fact that Pakistan has not responded overtly yet does not mean it will always choose not to. The strategic space remains open \u2014 and time, not politics, may determine the moment of reply.<\/p><p>Meanwhile, it\u2019s India\u2019s choice to pull off such stunts every few years, if it\u2019s fine with a price tag of nearly a billion dollar per strike and it\u2019s reputation as a nuclear-armed Hindutva driven state that is bent on pushing South Asia and world towards chaos.<\/p><p><em><strong>The views expressed herein are the author&#8217;s personal opinions and do not reflect the official policy or stance of any organization.<\/strong><\/em><\/p><p><strong>Author<\/strong><\/p><p><em>The author is the Arms Control Advisor, SPD.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India\u2019s recent cross-border strikes under Operation Sindoor, and the attempt to reframe them as a new counter-terrorism doctrine, may excite hawks and domestic audiences. But beneath the surface, this shift&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":71,"featured_media":21830,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"no","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[238,230],"tags":[277],"class_list":["post-21476","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-latest","category-strategic-stability-in-south-asia","tag-operation-sindoor"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21476","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/71"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=21476"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21476\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":21805,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21476\/revisions\/21805"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/21830"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=21476"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=21476"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=21476"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}