{"id":23464,"date":"2026-05-25T08:41:52","date_gmt":"2026-05-25T08:41:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23464"},"modified":"2026-05-25T08:45:47","modified_gmt":"2026-05-25T08:45:47","slug":"strait-of-hormuz-where-power-politics-trumps-international-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23464","title":{"rendered":"Strait of Hormuz: Where Power Politics Trumps International Law"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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In contemporary international relations, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is reflecting a fault line that is shaping global security. However, its legal status remains one of the most contested questions in international law. As tensions escalate between Iran, the US and Israel, the debate over whether the Strait of Hormuz is governed by innocent passage or transit passage is no longer academic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The difference between the two passages can be traced to the making of the international law of the sea, which is the product of centuries of conflict, negotiation, and resistance.  During the 15th and 16th centuries, Spain and Portugal dominated the routes of the Atlantic Ocean and divided the sovereignty of the routes between themselves. However, other European maritime powers refused to accept the claim of Spain and Portugal. The refusal is an early example of the persistent objection doctrine in which a state or group of states consistently refuse to accept a rule, thereby preventing it from becoming binding upon them as customary law. By the mid\u201120th century, the territorial sea was limited to 3 nautical miles. The limit was based on the cannon\u2011shot rule, <\/em>which reflected the power of the state to defend its territory towards the adjacent sea. The established international customary law went through a process of codification and progressive development, and consequently, the international community achieved a broad consensus on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994, and it has been ratified by 167 countries, making it one of the most widely accepted international treaties.  UNCLOS III codified two crucial regimes: innocent passage through territorial waters and transit passage through natural straits. The transit passage through the straits limited coastal states\u2019 ability to interfere with international navigation, regardless of 12 nautical miles territorial seas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran is not a party to UNCLOS III, and it has always objected to the application of the transit passage regime.  For instance, the 2016 detention of ten US Navy sailors from the Iranian territorial sea was a practical demonstration of Iran\u2019s legal stance. Geographically, the shipping lanes are divided within the territorial seas of Iran and Oman. On the other hand, the US has also not ratified UNCLOS III, and it maintains that the strait is subject to the transit passage application. However, Iran\u2019s persistent objection and physical control of the strait weaken the US claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most pertinent question is whether Iran or the US can lawfully impose a blockade on the strait? Direct military strikes by the US and Israel clearly meet the threshold of an armed attack, which triggers Iran\u2019s right of self\u2011defence and use of force permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. A belligerent blockade of enemy ports is a recognised and legitimate method of naval warfare; however, it must comply with the four basic principles of distinction, necessity, proportionality and humanity.  In a counter strategy, the US blockade is a reciprocal and limited blockade directed at Iranian ports, vessels, and associated shipping. At present, the blockade is providing Iran with significant leverage, through which Iran is defending itself from the US and Israeli aggression and pressing the international community to address its concerns. Within limited options, the Iranian consequential blockade is the preferred strategy over the use of force against non-US infrastructure in the neighbouring Gulf countries.  On the other hand, the US blockade is deemed to build pressure on Iran to gain a preferred outcome of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While assessing the blockade of the strait, one must acknowledge that the Iranian blockade is a consequence of the US and Israeli war on Iran. On the first day of war on 28 February 2026, all basic principles of international humanitarian law were ignored by attacking the civilian areas, including a strike on Shajareh Tayyebeh girls\u2019 elementary school in Minab, in which 167 girls and their teachers were killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In short, the legal regime governing the Strait of Hormuz remains unsettled. Iranian stance on the strait is deeply rooted in history, and for the same reason, Iran has not ratified UNCLOS III. The legal arguments are deployed strategically to assert lawfare<\/em>. The legitimacy of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be viewed in isolation. In the current interplay between power politics and law, the role of morality is a diminishing factor. Whether Iran will relinquish control of the strait and accept any third-party arrangement to govern it remains to be seen. The chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz reflects the changing nature of international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Author:<\/strong> Dr. Shakeel Ahmad is Director Foreign Affairs at Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies, Lahore. The author can be reached at <\/em>info@casslhr.com<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In contemporary international relations, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is reflecting a fault line that is shaping global security. However, its legal status remains one of the most…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":133,"featured_media":23465,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[236,238],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23464","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-global-nuclear-order-and-geopolitics","category-latest"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23464","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/133"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=23464"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23464\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23469,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23464\/revisions\/23469"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/23465"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=23464"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=23464"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=23464"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}