{"id":23522,"date":"2026-07-14T16:59:43","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T16:59:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23522"},"modified":"2026-07-14T17:02:00","modified_gmt":"2026-07-14T17:02:00","slug":"a-precarious-new-nuclear-age","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23522","title":{"rendered":"A Precarious New Nuclear Age"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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The announcement of a new weapon system is a moment in strategic history that indicates not only a change in military capability but also its implications on geopolitical stability. The Poseidon (also known as Status-6 and \u201cKanyon\u201d in NATO nomenclature), an unmanned, nuclear-powered undersea drone, is one such instance. Capable of carrying conventional or nuclear loads over long distances with minimal visibility, Poseidon is the epitome of technological innovation and the increasingly negative institutional context of international arms control. It is a reflection of the end of the Cold War arms-control regime and of the beginning of a new nuclear arms race in Europe.<\/p>\n\n

The Poseidon can travel at 200km\/h and drift stealthily along the seafloor before accelerating towards its target. A nuclear-capable stealth underwater drone, with 120 mph, has serious implications. First, it is very difficult to locate, and in a crisis, any misinterpretation can lead to a crisis. The weapon system\u2019s unique capability to \u201cloiter\u201d off enemy coasts to attack is a destabilising factor, especially in the North Atlantic or near friendly seaports or naval facilities. While Russian officials proclaim deterrence, Western capitals seem to be worried about the beginning of this new nuclear arms race in the sea. The Poseidon was unveiled at a time of arms-control institutional decay. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which stabilised the Euro-Atlantic region, collapsed in 2019 due to non-compliance. This removed the limits on land-based intermediary-range missiles, which had kept the potential for escalation in Europe at bay. The termination had not only formalistic implications but also symbolic ones that foreshadowed the breakdown of broader constraining frameworks. The major consequence today is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in February 2026. The new START verification system has been the only constraint on the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Russia\u2019s suspension of the treaty, while purporting to abide by its limits, already undermines transparency. In the absence of any new framework, the era of arms control between the US and Russia has ended for the first time since the 1970s.<\/p>\n\n

The political environment for arms control negotiations has been eroded. Differences over issues such as the Ukraine crisis, nuclear saber rattling, testing of new conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, and the breakdown of decades-long arms control frameworks have created a serious trust deficit between Russia and the West. Russia responded with nuclear threats in response to perceived Western aggression. Arms control and bilateral relations have been difficult to prioritise for US administrations amid the rise of China, the war in Ukraine, and domestic political constraints, while European capitals, despite Russian threats, emphasise increased deterrence and NATO unity. The other consistent problem with a replacement for New START is its exclusivity. Russia and the US have 90% of the world\u2019s nuclear stockpile. However, the rise of other nuclear powers weakens the bilateral argument. Russia has been keen to include other nuclear powers in a new treaty; the US has said it would if other nations are prepared. However, China has been unwilling to participate in trilateral constraints due to its capabilities and intentions. This implies that a successful next phase of arms control will have to draw on new ideas from the Cold War.<\/p>\n\n

Without arms control arrangements like New START, there are two ominous possibilities. First, both Russia and the US could, unconstrained, further diversify their arsenals, thereby reversing the decades-long decline in the number of nuclear weapons. Second, the lack of verification and transparency means that predictability – a key element of crisis stability – is lacking. Indeed, analysis suggests Russian nuclear modernization, despite programmatic hiccups, continues and is critical to its strategy. The consequences of this nuclear free-for-all are particularly acute in Europe. Predictable deterrence and a rules-based order have been the foundation of Europe. Without these, states may be inclined to pursue their own capabilities, either by upgrading or diversifying them, thereby further contributing to an undesirable arms race.<\/p>\n\n

However, can it be saved? It is unlikely to see a complete return to the Cold War arms control regime in a multipolar environment characterized by geopolitical rivalry and technological change. However, some steps can be made. A temporary extension of the core restraints of New START on an ad hoc basis would provide some constraints and time for discussion. Joint renewal of the moratorium on testing and discussions of new technologies could build confidence. Multilateral fora, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, can be employed. However, this is dependent on political will, which has been absent. Russia\u2019s Poseidon and the plethora of new delivery systems reflect flaws in the international system. They are real threats, but also reflect weak institutions. Without new thinking, new leadership, new modes of negotiation, and recognition of the public-good nature of strategic stability, we risk sliding back into a new, less predictable nuclear age. The alternative – a world without constraints and multiple delivery platforms – is fraught with danger, and past enemies and their allies must work towards it.<\/p>\n\n

Author:<\/strong> M. Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The announcement of a new weapon system is a moment in strategic history that indicates not only a change in military capability but also its implications on geopolitical stability. The…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":31,"featured_media":23523,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[232,238],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arm-control-and-disarmament","category-latest"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23522","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/31"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=23522"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23522\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23527,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23522\/revisions\/23527"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/23523"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=23522"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=23522"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=23522"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}