{"id":23708,"date":"2026-10-19T10:44:39","date_gmt":"2026-10-19T10:44:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23708"},"modified":"2026-10-19T10:46:26","modified_gmt":"2026-10-19T10:46:26","slug":"the-dangers-of-dual-use-technologies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23708","title":{"rendered":"The Dangers of Dual-Use Technologies"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Dual-use technology has existed for centuries, but it became a major cause of concern during the twentieth century. For example, a milling machine can be used to manufacture an aircraft component or a nuclear centrifuge. Similarly, a high-performance chip can serve civilian purposes, such as training generative artificial intelligence (AI) models for academic research in university laboratories, while also supporting military applications, including onboard computing, autonomous navigation, target recognition, and missile guidance systems, depending on its architecture and integration into the wider system.<\/p>\n\n

These are some of the common cases of dual-use technology, and that is precisely the reason why export controls exist at all. The duplicity of some of the technologies is also the reason why the \u201cexport controls\u201d per se are so hard to implement.<\/p>\n\n

Here is the dilemma: an all-encompassing export controls list can inadvertently strangulate the legitimate use of many technologies in the field of science, industry and development sector.<\/p>\n\n

However, a narrower categorization can lead to the proliferation of sensitive technology, which could ultimately land up in the wrong hands.<\/p>\n\n

Therefore, maintaining a balance between preventing proliferation and facilitating legitimate technological development has always been difficult at the global level, but it has become even more complicated because of the rapidly changing nature of dual-use technology.<\/p>\n\n

Thus, the problem is no longer confined to controlling physical equipment or materials, as many of the technologies now considered sensitive are embedded in commercial products, academic research, software, design data and technical knowledge.<\/p>\n\n

During most of the Cold War, export controls primarily focused on tangible items such as nuclear reactors, centrifuges, missile components and specialized chemicals.<\/p>\n\n

The control lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement were developed around this general principle of identifying sensitive goods and restricting their transfer.<\/p>\n\n

Similarly, Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) do talk about peaceful scientific cooperation, the exchange of technology and international assistance.<\/p>\n\n

However, a system which was designed decades ago to control physical shipments from crossing borders cannot be as effective in terms of intercepting the transfer of technological knowledge which can cross be transferred digitally across borders, sometime even without leaving a trail.<\/p>\n\n

Moreover, the problem becomes even more complicated when it is viewed from the perspective of the developing countries. They have been long arguing that most of the existing export control regimes make it very difficult for them to have access to the advanced technology.<\/p>\n\n

Undoubtedly, internationally coordinated export control regimes are necessary as they can provide greater consistency, reduce opportunities for circumvention and ensure compliance. However, the consensus-based model of such regimes can also become an impediment when members fail to reach an agreement.<\/p>\n\n

Having said that, the dual-use technology is not going away. The effectiveness of existing export control regimes will therefore depend less on the selective denial of technology alone and more on how controls are designed, implemented, and periodically reviewed. Moreover, such regimes must be sufficiently robust to prevent sensitive technologies from contributing to proliferation, while remaining proportionate, transparent, and responsive to legitimate scientific and industrial needs. Therefore, international cooperation, risk-based assessments, and predictable licensing procedures are essential to achieving this balance. It should be kept in mind that the challenge is not simply to prevent sensitive technology from reaching the wrong hands, but also to ensure that legitimate scientific and industrial progress does not become a casualty of geopolitical competition or a tool of coercive economic statecraft.<\/p>\n\n

Author: <\/strong>Mahnoor Anis is an International Relations scholar, lecturer, and researcher with experience at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS), Karachi. She contributes articles to Daily Pakistan, and her research interests include foreign policy, arms control and disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, strategic affairs, and regional security, with a focus on Pakistan and its wider geopolitical environment.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dual-use technology has existed for centuries, but it became a major cause of concern during the twentieth century. For example, a milling machine can be used to manufacture an aircraft…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":139,"featured_media":23709,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[229,238],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23708","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-emerging-technologies-strategies-and-warfare","category-latest"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23708","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/139"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=23708"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23708\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23713,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23708\/revisions\/23713"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/23709"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=23708"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=23708"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=23708"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}