{"id":23775,"date":"2026-09-23T08:41:35","date_gmt":"2026-09-23T08:41:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23775"},"modified":"2026-10-26T09:30:10","modified_gmt":"2026-10-26T09:30:10","slug":"india-and-pakistan-need-a-dialogue-on-autonomous-weapons-systems-aws-before-eruption-of-the-next-crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/?p=23775","title":{"rendered":"India and Pakistan Need a Dialogue on Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) Before Eruption of the Next Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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The most dangerous aspect of autonomous weapons may not be their speed, precision, or technological developments, but the unpredictability they introduce into an already tense and fragile security environment. Imagine a military confrontation between India and Pakistan in which neither side can be sure whether approaching drones are remotely controlled, AI-assisted, or operating autonomously. In an environment shaped by mistrust, ambiguity surrounding weapons capabilities, and nuclear deterrence, these technologies could further complicate decision-making when clarity matters the most. The problem is not necessarily that machines will start a war, but that decision-makers may have less time to prevent escalation. Dialogue on autonomous weapons will not resolve the rivalry between the two countries, but it may help prevent these technologies from making future crises difficult to control. Are India and Pakistan prepared to manage a crisis in which machines select targets and initiate military responses?<\/p>\n\n

The May 2025 India\u2013Pakistan conflict underscores the importance of preventive diplomacy on AWS. During the crisis, India and Pakistan reportedly deployed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munitions. According to the ISSI report<\/a>, Indian systems reportedly included HAROP, HARPY, Nagastra-1, Warmate R, Warmate 3, and ASL drones. Pakistani systems reportedly included YIHA III loitering munitions, Asisguard Songar, Chinese CH-4 and Wing Loong II UAVs, and Turkish Bayraktar and Akinci drones.<\/p>\n\n

In complex operational environments, including populated areas and border regions, sensor limitations, misidentification, and unexpected circumstances may increase the risk of errors with serious consequences for human life<\/a>. If a future India\u2013Pakistan crisis involves greater automation in military operations, how can both countries contain a limited confrontation before it escalates into a wider conflict and ensure that human judgment and meaningful control are retained under extreme time pressure?<\/p>\n\n

Traditional escalation has relied on credible threats, clear signalling, and sufficient time for assessment. AWS<\/a> can disturb this cycle because they can select and engage targets without further human intervention. Although humans develop these systems, they may independently select targets based on pre-programmed data once activated. This can leave operators uncertain about what or whom the weapons will strike, as well as where and when the strike will occur. Autonomous systems rely on algorithms, sensors, and data processing to perform these tasks. For example, a weapon may be programmed to identify a military vehicle based on its physical characteristics and automatically attack an object matching that target profile.<\/p>\n\n

The primary concern is the loss of human intervention during the use of force, making the impact of these weapons difficult to control. How can users be confident that a weapon will target a military vehicle instead of a civilian car? Even if it identifies a military target, what will happen to nearby civilians?<\/p>\n\n

Different types of autonomous weapons are used in conflicts. Mines are basic examples of weapons that activate automatically under specific conditions and have caused serious harm to civilians. AWS are also referred to as \u201ckiller robots,\u201d a term commonly used for systems that can select and engage targets without further human intervention. Other examples include air-defence systems that attack incoming missiles and some loitering munitions designed to destroy military radars, tanks, or armoured vehicles. These weapons may remain under human supervision, allowing operators to switch them off if the situation changes or something goes wrong.<\/p>\n\n

However, autonomous technology and its applications are evolving rapidly. Militaries and weapons developers are incorporating autonomous functions into a wider range of weapons, platforms, and munitions, including armed drones currently controlled remotely by human operators. The particular concern is the growing interest in using autonomous weapons to attack humans directly. Under international humanitarian law, responsibility for war crimes and other violations must be addressed. With AWS, however, determining responsibility for an unlawful attack may become more complicated. Who is responsible: the person who activates or operates the weapon, the developer, the military, or the state?<\/p>\n\n

The development and production of lethal autonomous weapons pose significant security challenges. Many countries<\/a>, including the US, the UK, India, Israel, Iran, South Korea, Russia and Turkiye, are developing these weapons. AWS also have strategic significance in South Asia, particularly for India and Pakistan<\/a>. Neither country has fully integrated AWS into its defence systems, but both have invested in researching and developing these technologies. AWS could shift the balance of power, intensify the arms race, and raise concerns about regional stability. Their rapid development presents strategic opportunities and significant challenges for two countries with a history of military rivalry and nuclear tensions.<\/p>\n\n

India<\/a> views AWS as important for maintaining an edge over Pakistan and other regional countries. It has invested in these systems to enhance its capabilities, strengthen deterrence along its borders, achieve self-reliance, and reduce dependence on foreign sources. India also aims to establish itself as a regional leader in autonomous weapons and robotics technology through research and development in AI, robotics, and advanced sensors. These developments could pose challenges to regional security and stability.<\/p>\n\n

Pakistan is also investing in AWS to defend its borders more effectively. However, these systems are a double-edged sword for Pakistan<\/a>, as they are transforming warfare strategies and security relations in South Asia. Pakistan therefore needs to strengthen its strategy and capabilities to respond to these emerging threats.<\/p>\n\n

Pakistan and India should not wait for an international treaty to begin bilateral diplomatic efforts to promote meaningful human control over AWS. Both countries need policies that regulate these technologies, support defensive stability, and reduce the risks of arms competition and escalation. They should also introduce bilateral confidence-building measures concerning emerging military technologies to reduce misperception and crisis escalation. A human\u2013machine teaming framework should ensure that ultimate control over important military decisions remains with political and strategic leadership rather than being left entirely to machines or AI. The strategic, legal, and ethical implications of AWS should be studied in universities, think tanks, and military research centres to help policymakers make informed decisions about their use and control. Ultimately, both countries need to engage in peaceful dialogue on AWS before another crisis breaks out.<\/p>\n\n

Author:<\/strong> Aneeba Zaheer, Research Intern, Center for International Strategic Studies, AJK.<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The most dangerous aspect of autonomous weapons may not be their speed, precision, or technological developments, but the unpredictability they introduce into an already tense and fragile security environment. Imagine…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":144,"featured_media":23776,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[232,238],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-23775","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arm-control-and-disarmament","category-latest"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23775","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/144"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=23775"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23775\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23797,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23775\/revisions\/23797"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/23776"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=23775"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=23775"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/strategicforecast.cissajk.org.pk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=23775"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}