India’s aggression on Pakistan in May 2025 left it scarred, exposed and disarrayed. Domestically, Indian political and military circles have tried their best to spin off their “ Operation Sindoor” as a success, a success that apparently continues till date. A lot is being written and analysed on the events that have seriously dented India and her armed forces global image. So much so that the discourse within the United States, that sought to make India as a counterweight to China, has changed, and to no comfort of India. For Modi, acceptance of ceasefire story is troublesome, where Indians are adamant to accept President Trump’s role in ceasefire on 10th May. The POTUS has proceeded, on multiple occasions, to flaunt his role in mediating ceasefire, and mentioning a sequence of events where Indian aircraft were shot down ( something that India is failing to sell to its own public). More so, the political opposition in India is railing against the Modi government and their version of events. Evidently , Indian military commanders, instead of a reasonable reflection, are indulging in political damage control in the rescue BJP. The IAF chief claimed about Indian air force shooting down PAF aircraft, in response to President Trump’s and Rahul Gandhi’s statements. It should be noted that PAF claims to have shot down six Indian aircraft ( three Rafales, One Mirage 2000, One Mig-29 and One Sukhoi-30). Indian side has failed to substantiate a single shred of evidence about their “ scores”.
The problem South Asia faces now is that, for India, the dent to its image has derided its construct of being a “ net security provider”. A country seven times smaller has tactically outflanked their numerically superior forces. The fact that Pakistan is being considered a peer competitor to India tells a lot about how India is being hyphenated across the globe, certainly to an evident discomfort of the Indian political leadership.
On a tactical side, India’s military posture faltered its war doctrines laid bare their vulnerabilities, their strategic calculus muddled, pushing them into the irrationality of escalating conflict with Pakistan on May 10th. India’s use of BrahMos on May 10th reflected a sense of desperation, all the while the IAF was grounded at forward based in proximity of Pakistan to avoid the May 7 episode.
The Round two that India is desiring for is being construed to be a naval undertaking which is evident from the discourse around the tactical necessity that is being rationalized by Indian military that the new war is a Non contact warfare , where missiles and stand-off munitions would be employed. The Indian navy that pretty much missed action, and for obvious strategic reasons, has vied for limelight that was taken by Army and Air Force. The BrahMos phenomenon now gives them a veneer of tactical superiority , which they think should be the first salvo of the next round with Pakistan.
Here a few complexities should be grasped. India produces BrahMos missiles in multiple variants and arms them across platforms in tri services ( Army , Airforce and Navy). Indian armed forces have ground based batteries that would fire multiple BrahMos towards Pakistan. And there is a high probability India did this on May 10th, using BrahMos batteries to target Pakistani airbases near the border. The trucks can launch multiple missiles and then scoot away to hardened bunkers to survive counter fire. But in doing so, they give away their locations and become prey to counter strikes. Pakistan knew about BrahMos batteries locations, especially in Beas and Nagrota which it also targeted in Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos.
Then comes the “ cool sounding” air launched BrahMos. But that too has complexities if India wanted to achieve counter force efficacy. Currently, India only has experimented with SU-30 jets that can carry single BrahMos missile per aircraft. The Sukhoi aircraft requires heavy maintenance and mission preparation takes time. Furthermore, when an aircraft is airborne it is gradually detected by long range and aerial based radar systems, which Pakistan tactfully deployed during May engagement. An Air launched BrahMos would be detected early on and its telemetry calculated for hard and soft kill measures. Back in May, AVM Aurangzeb of PAF in his part of the presser presented a small trailer of PAF engaging in soft kill tactics against incoming Indian projectiles, many of which were intercepted and augmented with evidence in form of radar signatures. This means that to launch nearly 20 BrahMos on Pakistan, 20 Sukhois would be airborne, and 20 targets for PAF to prey upon, precisely how Rafales went down on the night of 7th ( but with SCALP munition). IAF would not repeat this episode in any case.
Then comes the Navy, where a single vessel can be armed with tens of BrahMos missile ( and its new long range variants). After 2003, when the first naval launched BrahMos was tested from INS Rajput, India has gradually made the missile as its mainstay anti-ship armament, particularly in the context of Indo-Pacific maritime security. The Indian navy has unveiled plans to arm all its surface attack vessels with the missile. Interestingly, India tested a submarine launched version, from a submersible platform back in 2013 but has not been able to arm any of its submarines with the missile due to technical complexities. The submarine launched variant or BrahMos-NG will probably be armed with the future Project-75 I submarines, which will take many years to come. After Operation Sindoor, Indian Navy has been on a BrahMos procurement frenzy . India has plans to arm its vessels with more than 300 BrahMos missiles by 2030.
India’s unfounded confidence in Naval BrahMos capability is a recipe of destabilization. This is not just rhetoric but a preclude to disaster. The Indian Navy simultaneously commissioned two frontline frigates of the Nilgiri-class, INS Udaygiri (F35) and INS Himgiri (F34), on August 26, 2025. On the occasion the Indian Naval Chief remarked that Indian Navy is ready to deliver opening strike If Operation Sindoor were to resume. This was not the first admission, way back in May, the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh also claimed that “Indian Navy will lead New Delhi’s response to any future Pakistani aggression”.
With its ground and air launched BrahMos cache putting their feasibility for counter force targeting out of the equation , India’s inclination to use naval based BrahMos muddles the entire South Asian deterrence equation. The reason why Naval assets were kept at bay during multiple wars was for obvious reason- the massive escalation potential in case a single naval asset was hit. In case India tries to open the salvo through its navy, the survivability of its own assets jeopardizes because : firstly naval assets are easier to track , second they cannot shoot and scoot. They are like sitting ducks in open seas.
Indian minds would think that launching large volley of BrahMos against Pakistan naval targets, ports and land targets in proximity of coast would be an easy affair. They consider that their new stealth frigates would enable them to sneak into Pakistan’s territorial waters, deliver their payloads and return, considering that the stealth features like Reduced Radar Cross Section (RCS), Acoustic Quieting, Infrared (IR) Signature Reduction and Electromagnetic Emissions Control would actually help. However , the whole system remained untested in real battle scenarios, with the added irony of the fact that satellite intelligence is what Navies use for maritime surveillance.
In case India goes for this option, this would have immediate repercussions beyond South Asia. India’s tactical aim of striking targets by BrahMos would falter because of some tactical realities. BrahMos simply lacks the payload to inflict sizeable damage to ground based assets. India would need hundreds of them. Even if it employs hundreds, Pakistan has shown the capability to intercept the missile. For the May debacle, Indian Vice Chief of air staff claimed that less than 50 missiles were used against Pakistan by the force. From a military vantage point, a lot of these were intercepted by the PAF ( as mentioned earlier in the article). The ones that did strike were fired when India was rushing for a ceasefire and erratically carried out attacked right before the ceasefire came into effect.
Back to the Navy, Indian naval vessels after firing would be in open targets for Pakistan’s counter offensive assets. Pakistan has an array of air, ground and ship launched armaments prepared for this very scenario. Joint operations by Pakistan Navy and Air Force would provide little window for Indian Navy to escape the kill zone of Stand-Off precision munitions. Furthermore, Pakistani submarines would also engage the surface vessels launching Brahmos . The escalation would be too much for any of the countries to accept any off-ramps or third party mediations. Furthermore, India’s actions would naturally jeopardize sea lanes of communications in the Western Indian Ocean region that would be unacceptable to all major countries around the globe. The global trade and commerce would take a serious hit if war ensues in the Indian Ocean.
To sum it up, the false sense of confidence given by hundreds of Naval BrahMos which Indian navy is rapidly arming its vessels with and India’s political failure to reconcile with events of May 2025 , exacerbated by a desire to establish a “ new normal” would actually be a folly , a folly that would certainly backfire but will have irreversible effects. The hegemonic hangover in Indian defence circles made them underestimate Pakistan’s airpower, they are again repeating that when it comes to Pakistan Naval power. Pakistan’s Navy might be a Green Water Navy ( with elements of blue water emerging gradually) but it is a sizeable force that can ensure credible A2/AD.
For South Asian peace, Indian Navy propping up BrahMos to its political leadership and the latter resonating is a worrisome phenomenon. Had better sense prevailed, Indian strategists would have returned to the chalk board and reassess what happened in May, especially the Brinkmanship that nearly led to an all-out-War. Lastly, it is one thing to have a few aircraft shot down, and entirely another to get state-of-the-art naval ships sunken by an adversary.
About the Author:
Hammad Waleed is a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. He graduated with distinction from National Defence University, Islamabad. He writes on issues pertaining National Security, Conflict analysis , Emerging Technology, Strategic forecast and Public policy . He can be reached at hammadwaleed@thesvi.org and hammadwaleed82@gmail.com
