In May 1974, on a very fine morning, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conducted the first nuclear test in South Asia, thus opening a new chapter of proliferation in the region and declaring the test “Smiling Buddha.” The Indian logic behind calling the nuclear explosion Smiling Buddha was to project the bomb as a so-called “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” rather than a weapon of aggression. Ironically, the Smiling Buddha of South Asia took away the smile of South Asia forever, marking the beginning of a new chapter in the region’s history of proliferation.
Interestingly, at that time, Indian scientists and political leadership claimed that the sole purpose of the test was land mining and digging. Another reason they gave for the PNE was the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, but the interesting fact here is that China has a Nuclear No First Use policy. So, both claims India made about its nuclear weapon acquisition are not justified, and India became the first country in South Asia to pave the way for nuclearization in the region. Had India not built nuclear weapons, Pakistan would never have considered building one. It was India that triggered the cycle of proliferation in the region.
Moreover, Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, in his book India’s Nuclear Bomb, stated that entry into the UN Security Council is possible only for those with either economic wealth or nuclear weapons. Hence, for India, building and detonating a nuclear weapon was a shortcut to great-power status. Therefore, it was neither a peaceful explosion nor a response to the Chinese nuclear test. It was always about prestige and hegemonic ambitions in the region and beyond.
Furthermore, sometime after the Indian nuclear test, Pakistan gave several proposals to make South Asia a “Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone” and, in 1979, suggested simultaneous adherence to the NPT by both India and Pakistan, but India shrugged off both proposals.
During the 1965–1968 negotiations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India participated in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and engaged with the treaty process, yet ultimately refused to sign the final agreement. Its subsequent 1974 so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion” was therefore not merely a technological event; it represented a direct challenge to the emerging global non-proliferation order. At a time when most states were moving toward legal restraint, treaty-based commitments, and institutionalized arms control, India chose to breach the normative spirit of non-proliferation by demonstrating a nuclear capability outside the accepted framework.
India also played an active role in the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament in the mid-1990s by remaining engaged at all stages of the formulation of the treaty text. Nevertheless, repeating history, India not only vetoed the treaty by refusing to sign it but also voted against the CTBT resolution when it was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. Once again, India followed this by conducting multiple nuclear tests in 1998. The 1998 nuclear tests further confirmed that India’s participation in multilateral forums did not translate into acceptance of meaningful nuclear limitations. Instead, India repeatedly used diplomatic engagement to shape the debate while preserving maximum strategic freedom for itself. This conduct weakened the credibility of emerging arms control norms because it showed that a state could participate in norm-making processes while simultaneously refusing to internalize those norms.
India’s nuclear history reveals a persistent pattern of normative contradiction: active participation in global non-proliferation diplomacy on the one hand, and deliberate rejection of binding nuclear restraint on the other. This contradiction became visible at precisely the moment when the international community was attempting to consolidate nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a universal norm.
From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s posture also undermined regional restraint efforts. Pakistan’s proposals for a South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and simultaneous adherence to the NPT reflected an attempt to prevent nuclearization of the region through reciprocal commitments.
India’s rejection of these proposals signaled that it was unwilling to accept regional or global constraints unless they served its own strategic preferences. Thus, India’s nuclear policy distorted the normative trajectory of non-proliferation in South Asia. Rather than reinforcing the universalization of non-proliferation and arms control, India’s actions created a security dilemma, compelled Pakistan to reassess its own nuclear options, and contributed to the eventual nuclearization of the subcontinent. In this sense, India’s nuclear tests were not isolated acts of strategic autonomy; they were norm-disrupting moves that challenged the authority, universality, and moral legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime.
Author: Sana Ahmed, Research Associate, Strategic Vision Institute.
