India recently carried out the test of Intermediate range Agni Prime or Agni-P missile from a Rail based missile platform which is interpreted as purely a Pakistan specific development. It is a significant development in the context of strategic stability in South Asia, especially in the backdrop of May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict involving fighter jets, drones and missiles. In a hostile and nuclear environment with geographical proximity, all of which is synonymous to South Asia, such developments have far reaching implications for regional security. The case of Agni-P is particularly pertinent in this regard to analyze the developments that are drifting South Asia from recessed deterrence posture to a “Hair-trigger alert”, amplifying the risk of nuclear conflagration and threatening regional as well as global peace and security.
Technology for Instability
Agni-P is described by Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as the new generation advanced variant of the Agni series missiles. Notwithstanding the dubious history of DRDO’s tall claims, it is essential to analyze the impact of the development on regional security based on its officially stated parameters. The stark distinction between Agni-P and its predecessors of the same series is the composite motor casing for its both stages. Instead of using the metallic frame for housing the rocket motors, a composite material is used for this missile. The exact composition of the material for the strategic system such as Agni-P is never made public but it is reasonable to assume that it could be carbon fiber and resin made filament-wound pressure container for the motors. These materials have a proven record of withstanding immense pressure along with an added advantage of being significantly lighter than the conventional metal casing previously used for the same purpose. Consequently, due to high Fracture Strength and strength-to-weight ratio, it significantly reduces the overall mass of the missile thus giving the flexibility to either increase payload or extend the range based on the operational needs. Furthermore, since Agni-P is a canisterised missile, the material allows the rocket fuel to be stored for a long duration without the risk of corrosion to the casing, increasing the service span along with mobility. Perhaps it is the reason that this variant of missile was recently tested from a rail based platform.
The open source information released by DRDO and other Indian outlets have consistently relied on using the phrase “dual redundant navigation and guidance” to describe the advancement pertaining to Agni-P. Analytically it means that the missile has been integrated with more than one guidance systems to ensure its operational utility in case of a malfunction or if one of the system is jammed. Two or more systems could be running in parallel or one as a back up to provide redundancy such as component errors, sensor failure, software bugs, or jamming attempts while also providing two distinct streams of data to compare and cross-check if the missile is on course. Other than the inertial guidance, the missile is likely to have been integrated with satellite navigation. There could likely be an added layer of India’s indigenous NAVIC system integration other than the GPS constellation generally employed in such systems. Overall, the technological distinction of canisterised Agni-P compared to other missiles in Indian inventory, in parallel with the fact that its range makes it a Pakistan specific system, is highly destabilizing for regional peace.
From Recessed Deterrence to Hair Trigger Alert
Since the overt nuclearization of South Asia the threat of a nuclear conflagration was deemed relatively low due to recessed deterrence posture of both India and Pakistan. It was the conventional wisdom that since both countries would have to pass through several rungs of escalation ladder before nuclear contemplation, the crisis, in the meanwhile, would be diffused through the intervention of global powers. However, in the past 10 years there have been two major developments that have set the course for a conflict to potentially jump from conventional to nuclear domain in relatively instant succession. First being the two major crises between India and Pakistan in 2019 and 2025. During the former, the fighter jets bombed the each other’s territory while the latter saw the drones, missiles, and rockets targeting the military installations. Both episodes were historically the first instances of such direct military confrontations between the two nuclear states. Second, and perhaps even worrisome development in the context of both these crises, is the canisterisation of missiles which elevated India’s nuclear posture from recessed to ready to fire state. Furthermore, as per the PIB press release, the recent missile test was carried out “under a full operational scenario” implying that not just the DRDO scientists but Strategic Force Command (SFC) personnel were also involved in the test with real deployment configurations. All the relevant procedures such as canisterisation, transportation, erection, and firing were ostensibly tested by SFC crew as it would in a real operational scenario. The test parameters in particular hint at acquainting the crew with the operational launch, setting a dangerous path which also significantly increases the risk of inadvertent or unauthorized launch of a missile mated with nuclear warhead, barring an actual nuclear war.
As per publically available documents and statements, Pakistan continues to have a recessed deterrence posture. If the past two conflicts between India and Pakistan serve as a template, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of a nuclear escalation is compounded with the change in the Indian nuclear posture. The window for third party intervention for risk reduction is shrinking fast and the global powers need to facilitate a bilateral dialogue between both India and Pakistan. The previously held notion of a mid-crisis intervention might not be a viable proposition in the future conflicts.
Author: Akash Shah, Research Officer, Strategic Vision Institute.
