The fast-paced tech adoption has altered the character of conflicts in South Asia. The conflicts have become intense and brief, with compressed decision-making cycles. India used supersonic dual-use missiles, precision-guided munitions, and UAVs to attack civilian centers deep inside Pakistan’s territory. With this kind of force application, the conflict cannot be termed as limited in any sense. Indian belligerence stems from the revisionist Hindutva ideology, domestic political imperatives, and overconfidence fueled by the latest tech-adoptions. Glen Snyder’s stability-instability paradox prescribes that stability at the higher-level sponsors instability at the lower levels. In other words, states choose crisis as a replacement for all-out war. However, Indian military aggression does not commensurate with the lower levels of the conflict; it is something else.
Deterrence at its root aims to discourage an adversary from taking certain action, while raising its cost. Deterrence is psychological; perceptual factors are most important in understanding the dynamics of this game-play. On the contrary, Compellence aims to force an adversary to take certain action; the focus shifts from preserving the status quo to changing one. In compellence, a state threatens the use of force against an adversary if it does not choose a certain course of action. Indian military aggression can be explained with the latter form of strategic coercion: compellence.
However, executing compellence has its own limitations. Usually, to execute compellence, a power asymmetry between the two actors is required, which is not the case between India and Pakistan. It has an operational deterrent capability, with vertical range up to 2750km and horizontal reach across the tri-services, under the operational command of the National Strategic Force Commander (NSFC). To further cement its deterrence, Pakistan has recently raised an Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) to develop more flexible options for responding to India in evolving situations. The May 2025 conflict highlighted that Pakistan Armed Forces executed multi-domain operations, while linking space, cyber, electronic and legacy domains of war-fighting, to deny India any advantage it may have used to exhibit compellence. Furthermore, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) seemingly integrated all the sensors and shooters to create an effective kill chain, inflicting considerable damage to the Indian Armed Forces.
The “eye of the beholder” problem is another factor complicating the execution of the compellence. Pakistan may deem any action taken by India to ensure its deterrence as a form of compellence, thus complicating the strategic decision-making. India has long accused Pakistan of harboring terrorism inside its territory without sharing any credible evidence, and has launched so-called punitive strikes deep inside Pakistan to compel it. On the contrary, terrorism is emanating from inside India, maybe orchestrated by the Indian government itself as false-flag operations. In such a case, compelling Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, without addressing the structural reasons emanating from within India, will do nothing but force Pakistan to respond to any actions of compellence while doing the counter-escalation.
The potential of escalation in case a compellence threat may actualize is the primary concern for a state in giving concessions, and agreeing to the terms demanded by the adversary. What if the other side has the military capabilities to limit the escalation, rather than control it to its own advantage? In this case, the possibility of successfully executing compellence significantly dims. Compellence demands concessions being made at the public level. In the case of the Indo-Pak dyad, it seems far-fetched that India can control escalation to its advantage, and Pakistan will be publicly conceding to the Indians.
For Pakistan to discourage India from pursuing compellence in the future, it has to develop capabilities that deny India the escalation advantage. The likely acquisitions may include advanced air and missile defenses, anti-drone systems, conventional supersonic cruise missiles, and short-range Multiple Rocket Launch Systems (MLRS), Advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) suites fitted on the aircraft, as well as ground systems. Procuring and indigenously developing Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), seamlessly integrated with aircraft, their sensors and shooters. The basic idea is to raise the cost for Indian action at each rung. The weighted cost of each Indian action must exceed its calculated gains. The Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) pursued by Pakistan during the Operation Marka-e-Haq for inflicting considerable damage to India must become part of its doctrine for dealing with such situations.
During the Operation Marka-e-Haq, Pakistan has signaled effectively that any attempts of compellence akin to Operation Sindoor must be responded to similarly, maybe more intensely, as per the deemed situation in the future. India will only refrain from pursuing any misadventures if the costs are high; the campaign will likely become ineffective, and it is more lucrative to exercise restraint than aggression.
Pakistan and India must remain cognizant of the fact that in a nuclear environment there exists a recognizable risk of escalation to higher levels. Even by adopting best military practices, nuanced doctrinal thinking, and sophisticated operational planning and execution, inadvertent risks of escalation can not be ruled out. Escalation is not a rational policy decision in most of the cases; However, if India is repeatedly pursuing military campaigns to test the limits of South Asian deterrence, God forbid, due to a chain of unforeseeable events in the future, an event of mutual suicide is not unthinkable.
Exercising strategic prudence and refraining from pursuing reckless behavior is the only way out for the Indians. The compellence strategy pursued by Indians has failed badly, and the future is likely to be the same. Indians must learn this cardinal lesson that in a nuclear environment, there is no space for conventional warfare of any scale if strategic stability needs to be preserved.
Author: Saif-Ul-Haq, Research Officer, Strategic Vision Institute.
