Two months after fending off brazen attacks by two nuclear-armed states—Israel and the U.S. — Iran is engaged in nuclear talks with European countries. More importantly, however, it is trying to elicit support from China and Russia with a view to circumventing United Nations’ snapback sanctions. Iran has also sought non-attack guarantees as a precondition for the resumption of nuclear talks with the U.S. All of this is happening amid increasing skepticism over the impact of U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
These are still early days to assess the long-term ramifications of the 12-day war involving Iran, Israel, and the U.S. That said, there are three clear takeaways from this dangerous episode. First, Iran’s strikes on major Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv, highlight the limitations of nuclear deterrence and Israel’s nuclear opacity. Second, the Islamic Republic retains control over its population, as evidenced by the absence of protests against it during the war. Last but not least, both Iran and the U.S. have little appetite for fighting a direct war against each other.
The Limits of Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent
The most important takeaway from the war is that the existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons did not have any deterrent effect on Iran. While one could reasonably argue that Tel Aviv’s policy of nuclear opacity—a refusal to accept or deny the possession of nuclear weapons— makes deterrent threats less credible, Tehran has no illusions about Israel’s nuclear weapons program. This knowledge, in theory, should have partly contributed to deterring Iran from hitting Israeli targets, not least with ballistic missiles. However, what transpired during the war was different, highlighting the limits of both nuclear opacity and deterrence.
In the run-up to the war, Iran saw the disintegration of its all-important Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah and Hamas were operationally degraded, while Bashar al-Assad—Iran’s longtime ally— was deposed from power in Syria. Thus, when Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, Iran and its wartime leadership were left with only one retaliatory option: hurl drones and ballistic missiles at Israeli territory. As expected, it launched hundreds of missile and drone strikes, which hit targets inside important Israeli cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa. While most of the projectiles were intercepted by Israeli and U.S. missile defense systems, dozens were able to hit key strategic sites, including an oil refinery. That Iran launched multiple barrages of missile and drone strikes despite knowing that Israel has nuclear weapons means they proved to be an ineffective deterrent. This calls into question the strategic logic behind retaining nuclear opacity. It also accentuates the notion that deterrence is bolstered by clearly communicating to the adversary both resolve and capability. The corollary, then, is this: Israel’s population and military centers remain susceptible to adversarial action, and neither its superior conventional power nor its nuclear capabilities can fully deter kinetic operations.
The Islamic Republic: Bruised, But Not Defeated
The second takeaway from the war is that the Islamic Republic, while faced difficulties over the past year and a half, is still in control of Iran. The onset of the war resulted in the killing of key leaders—including some from the all-powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, the it recovered quickly, constituting a new wartime command. Its ability to recuperate and launch a counteroffensive against Israel and, later, the U.S. demonstrates its resilience.
The strength of the Islamic Republic is also evidenced by the absence of anti-government protests. If anything, Israeli and U.S. aggression created a rally-around-the-flag effect, with thousands of Iranians coming out to protest against strikes on their homeland. Opposition groups in Iran also condemned Israeli aggression, calling it a malign act. They further repudiated Reza Pahlavi—the son of the last Shah of Iran—and his outright espousal of Israel’s actions. Such an atmosphere burnished the approval of the Islamic Republic and it also sent message across that so called ‘regime change’ scheme is unlikely to materialize and such overtures will be swiftly spurned.
Positive Reluctance
The last of the immediate takeaways is that both the U.S. and Iran are reluctant to engage in a long-drawn war against each other. Trump’s uneasiness with using force is evidenced by his support for the now-scuttled nuclear talks with Iran. Moreover, Trump had unsuccessfully tried to talk Israel out of military strikes. A more pronounced attempt at avoiding a major war was made when Trump reportedly vetoed a more expansive, large-scale targeting proposal.
When the U.S. finally struck Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan, Trump indicated that he did not want further hostilities. While announcing the success of the bombing campaign, he wrote: “Now IS THE TIME FOR PEACE.”
Iran’s retaliatory effort, too, showed a desire to de-escalate. Iran not only pre-notified Qatar— hosting the targeted U.S. base —and the U.S. but also emphasized that its response was calibrated. Interestingly, Trump thanked Iran for notifying and hitting the empty Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In the same post, he reiterated the need to move toward peace and harmony. He would later announce a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, highlighting his interest in proactively terminating the war. According to news reports, the blueprint of the ceasefire agreement was finalized in a meeting between U.S. and Iranian interlocutors.
They signaled restraint and were willing to give each other a face-saving exit. This shows that both recognized the deleterious effects of a major war involving the two. Such recognition is an important source of strategic restraint, which must be maintained.
Invest in Diplomacy
Taken together, the three strategic takeaways point to Israel’s vulnerability, Iran’s resolve, and U.S. unwillingness to recalibrate Middle Eastern politics through the use of force. These lessons can be converted into one viable policy recommendation: give diplomacy multiple chances at success.
Author: Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, Deputy Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR).
