The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in September 2025 has sent ripples through the geopolitical landscape. Signed amid the ongoing instability in the Middle East, a region grappling with the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, simmering tensions between Israel and Iran, and a growing sense that the United States is no longer a reliable security guarantor, the pact immediately fueled speculation. Much of the international discourse jumped to the sensational conclusion of a Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” being extended to Saudi Arabia. This analysis contends that such speculations are misplaced. This focus on a nuclear angle overlooks decades of history and misunderstands Pakistan’s core strategic doctrine. The agreement’s pledge to treat an attack on one as an attack on both is not a nuclear guarantee. Instead, it represents the logical next step in a six-decade-long partnership, formalizing an already deep-rooted conventional defense relationship.
The Doctrine Barrier: Why a Nuclear Umbrella is Untenable
Any notion of Pakistan extending nuclear deterrence to Riyadh simply doesn’t align with the foundational tenets of Islamabad’s strategic policy. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is built on Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), a doctrine designed specifically as an alternative to the Cold War concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). At its heart, CMD serves a single, non-negotiable purpose: to dissuade India from military aggression and prevent a repeat of conflicts like the 1971 war.
Islamabad’s own declaratory policy has been unwavering: its nuclear arsenal is India-centric. Why, then, would Pakistan stretch its carefully calibrated and finite deterrent to cover complex security challenges in a distant theater against new, sophisticated adversaries? Doing so would not only dilute its effectiveness on the Eastern front but would also demand a radical, expensive, and destabilizing shift away from CMD. It would mean disrupting the hard-won strategic equilibrium with India, a risk Pakistan is unwilling to take.
Beyond doctrine, there is the practical matter of command and control. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under the exclusive authority of the National Command Authority (NCA), led by the Prime Minister. This centralization makes any NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangement a non-starter. Even a symbolic transfer of control would shatter Islamabad’s international credibility and invite crippling sanctions. It was likely with these realities in mind that Pakistani Defense Minister Khwaja Asif clarified shortly after the signing that nuclear weapons were simply “not on the radar.”
A History of Conventional Cooperation
The SMDA is not a sudden development but the formalization of a partnership grounded in decades of shared religious, strategic, and economic interests. The bedrock of this relationship has consistently been conventional military support, training, advisory roles, and troop deployments not nuclear promises. This alignment was famously captured after the 1967 war when King Faisal called Pakistan the “citadel of Islam.”
The history books are clear on this point, showing a pattern of tangible support. A key defense deal in 1967 opened the door for a continuous flow of Pakistani military expertise to the Kingdom. Since then, it’s estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 Saudi military personnel have been trained by Pakistan, with their officers becoming regular attendees at Pakistani military training institutions. This commitment has been repeatedly proven through direct conventional deployments, helping to secure Saudi territory.
A Timeline of Saudi-Pakistan Defence Cooperation
| Year/Period | Nature of Cooperation/Deployment | Strategic Significance |
| 1967 (Defense Deal) | Formalized training, advisory roles, and defense planning. | Built the foundation for ongoing military capacity building. |
| 1979 (Siege of Mecca) | Special forces support, followed by a long-term deployment of up to 15,000 troops. | Demonstrated a firm commitment to the Kingdom’s internal stability. |
| 1980s – Gulf War (1990) | Stationing of up to 20,000 troops and 6,000 military advisors. | Provided a robust conventional deterrent against regional aggression. |
| Ongoing | Continuous training for thousands of KSA personnel and joint exercises. | Ensures military interoperability and modernization of KSA forces. |
These deployments have always served a dual function: bolstering Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities while acting as an implicit deterrent. The presence of Pakistani forces has long served as a conventional tripwire, sending a clear message that aggression against the Kingdom would mean a conflict with a formidable, professional army. The SMDA, in this light, isn’t revolutionary; it merely puts a formal name to an existing reality.
Geopolitical Drivers and Very Real Limits
To understand the SMDA, it is necessary to examine Saudi Arabia’s evolving security landscape. Today, the primary threats facing Riyadh are not classic invasions but sophisticated asymmetric attacks, like the drone and missile strikes that targeted its oil facilities in 2019. The pact is a pragmatic effort to leverage Pakistan’s conventional expertise in countering these modern threats.
But this commitment is not a blank check. A telling precedent of that is Pakistan’s 2015 decision to decline sending combat troops to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. That choice was dictated by Islamabad’s need to manage its delicate relationship with neighboring Iran and avoid fueling sectarian conflict. This history forces us to read the SMDA’s “act of aggression” clause with a degree of nuance. While a full-scale conventional invasion of Saudi Arabia would almost certainly trigger a Pakistani response, it’s challenging to imagine Islamabad engaging in offensive operations against powers like Iran or Israel over limited, asymmetric strikes. Such a move would divert resources away from its primary front with India and expose Pakistan to geopolitical risks that it cannot afford. What emerges, then, is not a nuclear pact, but a framework for Extended Conventional Deterrence. It is a promise of substantial conventional assistance, from logistics and advice to the deployment of forces for territorial defense, but one that remains firmly contingent on Pakistan’s own core security interests.
Conclusion: A Pact of Solidarity, Not Fission
Stripping away the speculation, the SMDA is a mature evolution of a security relationship that has served both nations well for over half a century. It offers Saudi Arabia a more reliable conventional deterrent in a region where old guarantees are fading. For Pakistan, it solidifies vital economic and diplomatic ties while allowing it to maintain the unshakeable, India-focused doctrine of its nuclear program. Talk of a Pakistani nuclear umbrella, then, misses the point entirely. It is a notion unsupported by doctrine, history, or strategic reality. The nuclear question will remain a national one for Pakistan. This defense pact is about reinforcing a proven, conventional alliance, not about rewriting the nuclear rulebook for the Middle East.
Author: Syed Raza Abbas, Research Associate, Strategic Vision Institute Islamabad.
