Operation Sindoor represents more than just India’s conducting military strikes against civilian targets inside Pakistan. It reflects a key change in India’s military doctrinal approach. The change has been recently confirmed by India’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, in his latest book, in which he acknowledged the shift in how to conduct operations against Pakistan. He introduced this concept, known as the Dynamic Response Strategy (DRS), in Chapter 13 of his book. He stated that this doctrine represents a gradual transition from the previous Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) or Proactive Operations Doctrine. It does not supersede the older concepts altogether, but rather an attempt to provide new solutions to contemporary challenges and political demands. It aims to focus on employing a low-manpower but high-tech force to conduct military operations. The DRS execution during the May 2025 crisis suggests that the doctrine is operational, with its primary target being Islamabad rather than Beijing.
The decision to adopt DRS was first hinted at by the then Indian Army chief, Gen MM Naravane, in 2020, when he stated that India is “focusing on a dynamic response along its western and northern borders, below the threshold of an all-out war”. This set the foundation stone for the change in doctrine of the Indian armed forces, which later emerged in the form of DRS.
General Anil shed brief light on this doctrine in his book “Ready, Relevant and Resurgent II: Shaping a Future Ready Force.” He pointed out that the doctrinewas born out of the experience gained from the Balakot air strikes and Operation Zafran (the activity of the Indian army during the 2019 Pulwama Crisis). It is not restricted to surgical strikes, but according to General Anil, the Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) were also sanctioned under the dynamic response strategy, which is based “on preemption and proactive operations”. This implies that the new doctrine aims to provide a range of strike options to the Indian political elite to choose from according to the situation’s requirements beforehand. This affirms the notion that this newer concept is broader than the one previously followed by the Indian military.
The doctrine has another ingredient that has attracted less attention, the element of deception. As part of DRS, the Indian military selected the cover of peace-time military manoeuvres to launch military attacks in order to deceive the adversary during a crisis. The Indian military leadership realized that during a heightened tensions environment, Pakistani defensive assets would be on alert. Therefore, to deceive them and gain an advantage, it is better to launch attacks under the cover of military exercises. The Indian Air Force strikes in the early hours of May 7 are the textbook example of this side of the doctrine because just a few hours before the launch of military operation against civilian targets in Pakistan, the IAF announced to conduct a “pre-planned routine” two-day exercise on May 7 and 8 along the southern and western section of the international border. However, because of Pakistan’s Air Force vigilance, multiple hostile IAF combat aircraft were shot down, including the Rafael, which targeted Pakistan’s civilian infrastructure.
India is not stepping back, as evident from its decision to pause Operation Sidnoor rather than ending hostile military activity. Since May 2025, the Indian military has undergone a massive modernization drive, which includes acquiring advanced weaponry, investing more in emerging technologies like drones, preparing for drone warfare, restructuring its forces, placing an order for the acquisition of weapons and ammunition under the emergency clause, and conducting belligerent maneuvers in proximity to land and maritime borders simultaneously, such as exercise Trishul.
As the new DRS doctrine is based on “preemption and proactive operations,” its execution is likely to become more frequent, posing additional challenges for Pakistan in the near future. To counter this emerging threat, Pakistan can adopt two paths simultaneously. Pakistan needs to enhance its guardrails. Keeping in view the evolving threat perception, Pakistan’s priority should now be to procure newer, sophisticated systems such as HQ-19 SAM, J-35 combat aircraft, PL-17 air-to-air missile, KJ-500 AWACS, JY-27V radar, and additional combat-proven units like J10 C, PL-15, and C-400 from China as soon as possible before the beginning of the next crisis. Although this exercise will put strain on Pakistan’s economy, in light of the force and capability that India is building up, it is essential for Pakistan to at least qualitatively counter India’s force buildup, thus preventing the conventional asymmetry from growing any further. On the other hand, Islamabad should continually remind the world community of New Delhi’s adoption of a provocative doctrine, whose application on the ground has been witnessed by the world in May 2025.
Lastly, but essentially, Pakistan needs to change its rules of engagement. The time has come for Pakistan to unequivocally convey to India that if Islamabad finds credible intelligence about an imminent attack by New Delhi, it will preemptively neutralize those threats, which are poised to undermine the country’s sovereignty as well as the security of its people and critical infrastructure.
