On 31st October 2025, India secured a landmark 10-year Defence Framework Agreement with the US. This deal was signed on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting-Plus between Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This agreement establishes institutional collaboration between the two states in all fields: land, air, maritime, undersea, space, and cyber. It also offers intelligence sharing, development of advanced technologies, joint military exercises, and improved interoperability.
The pact is a clear indication of Washington’s strategic desire to make India its premier partner in the Indo-Pacific. In retrospect, the Indian military’s modernization has been greatly accelerated with the adoption of previous accords, especially the Defence Frameworks of 2005 and 2015, as well as key agreements such as COMCASA and BECA, which provided New Delhi with access to US technologies and advanced geospatial intelligence. With the recent 2025 pact, this will be enhanced multifold, providing India with the means to achieve an extended operational reach and interoperability with the US.
Recently, Pak-US relations have seen a positive turn, especially after its much-hailed Operation Bunyan al Marsoos in May 2025 as a response to major Indian incursions on Pakistani soil. President Trump has since appreciated Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership for averting a larger conflict with India and for their contributions to regional security. This has led to renewed dialogues on regional stability, counterterrorism, and economic cooperation, after years of estrangement. Therefore, despite being acclaimed as a ‘strategic milestone’ for Indo-Pacific security by some experts, this decade-long defence framework holds profound implications for Pakistan’s strategic posture and security calculus as it could reshape the regional balance of power.
For Pakistan, the consequences are obvious in strategic terms as the deal entrenches India’s asymmetrical advantage in both conventional and non-conventional spheres. This is especially concerning amidst India’s aggressive military doctrines, such as the Cold Start Doctrine, which allows limited conventional offensive operations against Pakistan without escalating to nuclear attack. Improved ISR capabilities provided by the US might make such doctrines more aggressive by reducing India’s decision-to-action time and shortening Pakistan’s strategic response time. The overall effect is an increased threat of miscalculation and a potential crisis escalation, disrupting the strategic stability in the region.
Pakistan, in this regard, will face increased pressure to maintain credible minimum deterrence (CMD), prompting investment in upgrading its nuclear weapon delivery systems, MIRVs, and second-strike capabilities and relying more on nuclear and asymmetric deterrence. All these factors will eventually exacerbate a never-ending security dilemma between the two nations, which have just fought a deadly war just a few months ago.
Interestingly, this recent accord between New Delhi and Washington holds a dual reality: strategic convergence but economic competition. Due to purchasing Russian oil and funding Russian war equipment in Ukraine, President Trump initially announced 25% and later 50% tariffs on multiple Indian goods exported to the US, which fully took effect in August 2025, with an additional 25% penalty for India’s refusal to stop buying oil from Russia. This dual foreign policy presents significant maladaptive inconsistencies in Washington’s dependency on New Delhi as a reliable partner. These contradictions can be exploited by Pakistan, which portrays itself as a stabilizing, realist player that seeks balanced relations with all major powers and avoids overdependence on a particular bloc.
Diplomatically, the decade-long agreement risks alienating Pakistan within the evolving Indo-Pacific security framework, limiting its role to counterterrorism operations or Afghanistan-related collaboration. Regarding regional interoperability, it marginalizes Islamabad in U.S.-led efforts, including the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Consequently, Pakistan will have to strengthen its relationships with China, Russia, and major Middle Eastern countries, thereby balancing the U.S.-India alliance.
Regionally, this pact entrenches a dual-axis competition in South Asia, notably the US–India–Japan–Australia alignment vs the China–Pakistan–Russia counterweight, making the Indian Ocean a contested strategic arena. Pakistan’s strategic location in the vicinity of maritime chokepoints makes it both a stakeholder and a vulnerable target in this new rivalry. Indian naval development, based on US logistical support and technology transfer, poses a major threat to Pakistan’s maritime security and deterrence standpoint.
To address these issues, Pakistan needs to increase its involvement in other multilateral systems. Being proactive in SCO, OIC, and ASEAN-Plus discussions offers a platform to advance regional security issues, enhance security cooperation mechanisms, and project a narrative of restraint and stability in Pakistan. The increased inclusion of Islamabad at multiple forums can be leveraged to counterbalance India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific by providing alternative economic relationships.
CPEC, or more recently, CPEC 2.0, presents Pakistan with a unique opportunity to strengthen its economic and technological progress by modernizing its industry, developing its maritime sector, and increasing its strategic depth in the Arabian Sea vis-à-vis China. Likewise, Russia’s growing alignment with Asia and its relative estrangement from Western markets provide space for defence-energy partnerships with Pakistan. Also, closer alignment of Ankara’s strategic interests in Islamabad presents avenues of defence cooperation.
To sum up, Pakistan’s response to the challenges presented by the Indo-US defence agreement should be multi-dimensional, rooted in credible deterrence, diplomatic diversification, and economic modernization. Maintaining its deterrent credibility through technological advancements and second-strike capability without engaging in an expensive arms race should be Islamabad’s priority. Diplomacy needs to focus on strengthening relationships with Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, and the Gulf countries to establish a strategic network that avoids overdependence on any single partner.
Authors: Saher Liaqat is an MPhil Scholar of Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad. She has been associated with the Hanns Seidel Foundation as a research fellow. She has also worked at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and the China Study Centre at COMSATS University Islamabad. Her areas of interest are the US-China competition, Non-Traditional Security threats, and the Politics of South Asia.
Abu Hurrairah Abbasi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defence University in Islamabad, Pakistan. He has also been associated with an Islamabad-based policy think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. His research interests include the politics of South Asia, emerging technologies, and non-traditional security threats.
