In the midst of brewing geo-political tensions transcending the terrestrial bounds; weaponization of space is no longer a distant notion, but a plausible reality. Variety of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that can be terrestrial based (direct-ascent ASAT Weapons), co-orbital ASAT weapons and dual use Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) are not make-believe weapon systems anymore. As the major powers deliberate on space governance, pronounced voices are being raised from the Global South about the growing military buildup in space. However, Global South’s perspective has not been given due attention at international forums including Conference on Disarmament (CD) for negotiating Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty. Long stalled negotiations have made PAROS a long shot to make.
Emerging space nations of Global South require space technologies in their agriculture, climate monitoring and disaster management. Global power dynamics must not by any means impair the capabilities of countries from the Global South for an equitable access to space and related technologies for ensuring Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDG’s) in a comprehensive manner.
With-in the existing legal framework, Outer Space Treaty (OST) constitutes the foundation of this regime, regulating the peaceful uses of outer space and prohibiting the deployment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) including the nuclear weapons in the orbits around the earth. However, there is no explicit provision in OST for regulating or banning variety of conventional kinetic and non-kinetic weapon systems in the outer space.
Inadequacies in the international framework for preventing arms race in the outer space adds to the confidence of states for developing, testing and deploying weapons in the outer space. Amid these developments, there is a pressing need to negotiate a legally binding treaty for preventing arms race in the outer space.
Contrasting perspectives on preventing arms race in outer space emanates from the two UNGA resolutions being pitched in 1981. One of the resolutions proposed by “Western Europe and other states” stressed on prohibiting ASAT systems. On contrary, the other resolution tabled by “Eastern Europe and other states” advocated for banning all kinds of weapon systems in outer space. Despite the procedural progress being made on PAROS, over the years, the divergence in perspectives has been intensified.
Meanwhile, in 2008 Russia and China introduced a draft treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) in the CD. For the first time, this draft treaty covered the definitional aspects pertaining to terms like ‘outer space’, ‘weapons’ and ‘use of force’; although it lacked any mechanisms for verification. In 2014, Russia and China tabled a new draft. However, the US opposed the draft treaty, while citing the lack of verification measures as the core concern.
Global South’s perspective presents a different voice in the superpower’s chessboard — focusing more on ensuring equitable access to space and collective security for all. While brushing aside the power differentials, Global South usually represented by G-21(Group of 21) in the CD, makes a distinct yet decisive voice for harnessing the benefits of space exploration; voicing criticism over space weaponization. For averting the dangers to international peace & security emanating from space, G-21 places great responsibility on the Global North for fostering transparency and Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s), aiming to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space.
While acknowledging the shortcomings in the existing legal framework for regulating the outer space and preventing its weaponization; G-21 has made repetitive calls for bolstering the legal framework for efficiently curtailing the weaponization of space. G-21 considers CD as the most effective multi-lateral forum addressing the issues related to disarmament; henceforth voices a strong opinion for starting negotiations on “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” without any delays.
G-21 considers the draft treaty tabled by Russia and China as a decent start point for commencing negotiations on a legally binding instrument on preventing weaponization of outer space. In lieu of above, G-21 remains steadfast for advocating an ad hoc committee for negotiating a legally binding treaty, as the current Subsidiary Body (SB-3) in CD aims to anchor focused discussions, and lacks the mandate for negotiations.
Pakistan being representing the Global South, has extended unwavering support and brought forth fresh perspectives on negotiating a legally binding framework. Recently, Pakistan has issued a statement in the CD comprehensively addressing the definitions and verification issues.
For ensuring comprehensive space security, an integrated approach focusing both on the capabilities and behaviors must be established. Despite the prevalence of dual use items in space, a targeted approach reveals a class of purpose-built weapons, being used exclusively for the application of force in, from, or through outer space. These include space-based inceptors, Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS), or Direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles. For defining and characterization of a space weapon, intent and capabilities of the systems must be analyzed together to overcome definitional ambiguities.
Among the concerns raised by developed nations of the Global North on a legally binding treaty for preventing arms race in the outer space; verification problem tops the list. Space being the most monitored domains, challenges to its verification are not insurmountable. Accounting for the technological advances in the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) networks, outer space objects can be tracked with greater precision.
Norms of responsible conduct in outer space cannot by any means serve as the replacement of a legally binding framework. Geopolitical contestations must not stall the process for negotiating a legally binding treaty on preventing arms race in the outer space in the CD. Technological divide between Global North and South must be bridged to build the capacity of developing countries for ensuring effective participation in the ongoing negotiations at the CD.
The author is a Research Officer at SVI.
