A few days ago, India announced two consecutive launches of Pralay short-range ballistic missiles as part of user trials. These tests were conducted to validate the missile’s performance. This marked the completion of Phase I user trials, which indicates that the missile is cleared for mass production. Pralay reflects New Delhi’s ambition to acquire a conventional counter-force capability against Pakistan. The missile development aligns with the proposed idea of the Integrated Rocket Force (IRF), whose objective remains the same. This has serious ramifications for Pakistan because the creation of a conventionally armed rocket force, equipped with a precision system like Pralay, offers a credible pre-emptive strike package to New Delhi.
Pralay is a next-generation missile developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It can be launched along a quasi-ballistic trajectory, which enhances its probability of evading enemy missile defenses. It can carry a payload to a maximum range of around 500 km while travelling at a hypersonic speed of Mach 6.1. The missile payload varies from 350 kg to 700 kg depending on the range and mission. It can carry diverse types of warheads, including high explosive warheads, Penetration Cum Blast (PCB) warheads, or runaway denial penetration submunition (RDPS), etc. Pralay can strike with surgical precision because its circular error probability (CEP) is less than 10 m, which enables it to target the adversary’s critical infrastructure. The missile can be launched from a 12×12 or an 8×8 launcher, which carry two and one missile per launcher, respectively. Pralay is propelled by solid fuel and can be stored inside a canister like other Indian systems, allowing the missile to launch immediately.
The development and future deployment of Pralay should not be viewed in isolation. The missile program is part of India’s strategy to conduct strikes at lower levels of conflict. India has been considering establishing a separate command known as IRF to achieve this. The idea was first floated by General Bipin Rawat, former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), who remained a staunch proponent of the IRF. In 2021, he revealed India’s intentions to build a new rocket force. The rocket force is expected to remain independent of India’s Strategic Force Command (SFC), thus retaining operational control of only conventional armed cruise and ballistic missiles. The force will comprise a diversified package including Pralay, Nirbhay, and BM-04. The IRF concept, as stipulated, will be distinct from the existing tri-services SFC because its role is considered conventional. Regarding the operational control of the rocket force, according to the Indian defence expert Brigadier Arun Sahgal, the commander can be from the Army or the Air Force on a rotational basis.
Does India need a separate missile command capable of fighting conventional wars in a nuclearized environment? India does require it because, since the overt nuclearisation of the region in 1998, the room for limited war no longer exists. Both countries possess nuclear weapons, advocating for restraint rather than finding a way to launch a limited war. Moreover, India claims that IRF is there to counter PLARF, which is nothing but a strategic hoax, as post-1962, India and China have never been engaged in a confrontation that saw the use of kinetic weapons. However, if one looks at the ranges of IRF missiles, the force appears Pakistan-centric.
Another critical issue is worth considering. The IRF should not be seen only as a defensive force whose purpose is to deter the adversary, but its true nature is in launching missile salvos against the enemy. The IRF will be a potent force because it will have solid-fuel missiles in its arsenal, stored in canisters, allowing the military to launch them immediately. In addition, it is tailor-made for neutralising the adversary’s critical infrastructure, including air bases, ammunition dumps, command-and-control centres, major cantonments, and logistics nodes, which are comparatively difficult to intercept by ground-launched vectors.
Although the IRF is conventional and has no nuclear role, its formulation and operationalization are still dangerous steps. This is because the missiles part of the IRF are said to be integrated with conventional warheads. Still, during hostilities, it becomes difficult to distinguish whether an incoming missile is armed with a conventional warhead or a nuclear one. Moreover, given the fact that India also possesses missiles mated with nuclear warheads, the new missile force will likely entangle Indian nuclear and conventional forces, especially in times of crisis. Upon establishing the IRF, it will endow New Delhi with the capability to launch strikes against its opponents with missiles carrying conventional warheads.
Additionally, there are certain risks associated with the formulation of IRF. For instance, the Indian military holds a view that a conventional missile barrage against Pakistan will not yield a nuclear response. This is a big gamble because of a key critical issue. First, if India launched pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan’s military command and control centres, Pakistan could perceive it as a first strike to de-capacitate its command-and-control infrastructure. During this fog of war, a probability might exist that Pakistan can be compelled to respond with weapons of last resort if India began to neutralize the country’s C2 one by one.
The Pralay and IRF combination is part of India’s current strategy to have additional options for launching pre-emptive strikes from standoff ranges. The IRF establishment is likely to increase the likelihood of a limited conflict because it is designed to fight a conventional conflict in the presence of nuclear weapons, which prohibits the initiation of hostilities in the first place. However, as shown by the four-day conflict in May, which started when the Indian military targeted various locations inside Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and lost several aircraft during the operation, India seemed more determined than ever to operationalize the rocket force. Therefore, the IRF operationalization will likely increase the chance of India pre-emptively launching strikes against Pakistan because its inherent character is offensive and not defensive.
The author is an M.Phil Scholar at National Defense University, Islamabad.
