The advent of the 21st century has brought major transformations to the global geopolitical landscape. The US, as a sole superpower, is investing in new partnerships, strengthening existing alliances and partnerships, and engaging in minilateral groupings such as the Quad and AUKUS. One key strategic partner that stands out in this shifting power dynamic is India. Washington has invested heavily in its relationship with India transcending political, defense, economic, and diplomatic fronts. This strategic partnership has not materialized overnight. The Indo-US bilateral relationship has remained stable and steady regardless of which political party (Democrat or Republican) held power in Washington. It reflects a bipartisan consensus on the strategic importance of the partnership.
A significant breakthrough came in July 2005, when the US and India signed two landmark agreements for cooperation in defense and high-end technology. These agreements reflected Washington’s desire to expand ties and acknowledged India as a strategic partner in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Multiple factors contributed to this embrace it includes India’s status as the “world’s biggest democracy,” its growing economy and military capabilities, and its location in the Indian Ocean.
A central factor was the US desire to use India as a counterbalance to China. Both powers shared concerns over Beijing’s expanding economic and military footprint in South Asia. This common objective reinforced Washington’s expectation for India to assume the role of a “net-security provider” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the broader Asia-Pacific. The term itself was introduced in 2009, when the US Secretary of Defense stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue, “We look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond”. To assess India’s role as a ‘net-security provider,’ four core areas must be evaluated: capacity building through training of foreign civilian and military personnel, military diplomacy through port calls and joint exercises, provision of military assistance via defense exports, and the ability to undertake direct military deployments during crises. There are several barriers to India meeting these expectations.
First, it faces substantial resource constraints. Its strategic ambitions do not match its defense spending, limiting its ability to project power and sustain operations beyond its immediate neighborhood. Second, its domestic defense manufacturing sector remains heavily dependent on imports for advanced systems and platforms. Third, India adheres to a traditionally non-aligned and strategic autonomy-oriented foreign policy. This has led to an ambiguous approach to security matters, making New Delhi reluctant to engage in direct interventions or take on binding security commitments. Related to this are India’s bureaucratic and procedural inefficiencies, which hinder its ability to respond swiftly during crises. Fourth, sustained power projection requires overseas military bases, which India lacks. Its logistical capabilities, especially in distant regions of the Asia-Pacific, are limited. Fifth, India faces internal security problems in areas like Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) and regions affected by Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in the North East. In addition to internal unrest, persistent border tensions with China and Pakistan further drains its capacity to project power externally.
Despite these limitations, New Delhi is willing to fulfill the US expectation to some extent. This willingness stems from India’s perception of South Asia as its sphere of influence and the belief that it is strategically positioned to fulfill this role. Most notably, India seeks to counterbalance China’s regional footprint, as evident from its vocal opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India under Modi views the US-encouraged role of a “net-security provider” as an opportunity to push back against China’s growing influence. This ambition is also visible in India’s support for alternative connectivity initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The goal is to position itself as a credible regional power and a counterweight to China’s economic and geopolitical initiatives.
The US has supported these ambitions through a series of bilateral agreements and strategic frameworks. This includes regular joint military exercises (Malabar and Tiger Triumph), initiatives like DTTI and iCET, support for military modernization via Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales, and waivers on export controls and high-tech trade despite India not being a signatory to the NPT. Moreover, the two sides have signed four foundational agreements GSOMIA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA.
However, despite this ongoing support, expectations from India to act as a “net-security provider” remain overly optimistic. The first reason lies in the mismatch between US and Indian strategic goals. New Delhi’s ambitions are primarily regional, asserting dominance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. It has only offered diplomatic support to rival claimants in the South China Sea (SCS) and avoids direct involvement in the SCS dispute. India also adheres to the “One-China” policy and has taken no explicit stance on Taiwan.
In contrast, the US views the region through a global lens shaped by its broader strategic rivalry with China. The second and perhaps most significant constraint is the power gap between India and China in both economic and military terms. China is currently the world’s second-largest economy, with resources to project influence regionally and globally. India, while being the fifth-largest economy, faces a growing imbalance as China’s defense budget remains nearly three times larger. Despite unresolved border disputes, India cannot afford to act against China on behalf of the US. Other constraints include economic interdependence with China, divergent threat perceptions, and India’s aim to present itself as an independent pole and leader of the Global South. India is not a formal treaty ally of the US and insists on maintaining strategic autonomy. The 2020 border crisis with China exemplifies India’s preference for a diplomatic resolution rather than military escalation.
Another factor limiting India’s alignment with US expectations is Washington’s continued engagement with Pakistan. This reality, despite the US’s multifaceted cooperation with India, is not well received in New Delhi. A third key development that has challenged India’s credibility is the recent May 7–10, 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan. This short-duration conflict exposed operational deficiencies and dented India’s reliability as a “net-security provider.” Despite heavy US investment in India’s military modernization, including defense cooperation, technology transfer, and intelligence sharing, its performance in actual combat was unimpressive.
These points collectively indicate that expectations for India to act as a “net-security provider” are unrealistic and premature. The two sides are pursuing different strategic objectives. While India seeks to leverage Western concerns about China to gain geopolitical and technological benefits without committing to formal security roles. In contrast, the US wants India to actively help counterbalance China. India is not appropriately positioned to fulfill this expectation due to structural gaps, internal turmoil, and hegemonic ambitions manifested in its hostile policies toward neighboring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Therefore, it can be asserted that India will utilize the China factor as a tool to seek Western support without truly acting as a reliable security provider in the region.
Author
Muhammad Abubaker, currently working as a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)
