It was on March 9, 2022 that an Indian BrahMos cruise missile created some panic in South Asia when it landed at Mian Channu in Pakistan. What followed next was a series of debatable inquiries and anecdotes from Cold War citing how similar ‘accidents’ are in fact exceptionally common. The concern, however, remains unanswered; was it an accident, a mechanical failure, an unauthorized launch or a deliberate activity. In all of the aforementioned cases, one thing that kept standing out was possible impact of dual-capable platforms causing distortion between conventional and nuclear aspect of strategy. Although the buzzword these days is Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) as it refers to use of dual-capable platforms in a high escalation environment, it does allude to the risks of entanglement. Fast-forward to the more recent crisis between Pakistan and India, deliberate use of BrahMos cruise missiles on military targets indicates that what happened in Mian Channu can now be interpreted in a different light. Adding the recent news of India planning to design its Agni missile platform for conventional strikes, makes distinguishing between conventional and nuclear aspects of deterrence increasingly obscure. For Pakistan, the situation is one where such steps seem to be indicative of undermining Pakistan’s deterrence commitment through brinkmanship, while simultaneously reserving the right to a second strike. It is a dangerous predicament, with visible signs of a unilateral push towards Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); a Nixonian ‘Madman’ in South Asia. The major question thus remains; can South Asian nuclear deterrence endure coercive bargaining outcomes?
Narendra Modi’s Alea iacta est: Can New Delhi sustain the pressure of escalation?
Ever since the Modi administration took over, there were two major developments in its Pakistan position; firstly, Pakistan is to be seen in the light of Chinese geopolitical ambitions in South Asia and secondly, surgical strikes are a panacea for all problems. Despite Islamabad’s offer to engage in bilateral investigation of transnational terrorism in the region, Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to be in a Alea iacta est (the die is cast) position. The offer by Islamabad still stands but for New Delhi, the Prime Minister’s position seems to be the state’s only choice. A major caveat in this approach, however, is the mounting pressure on Indian armed forces to keep delivering their best and on Indian economy to keep increasing its expenditure on ensuring the same. What follows is a risky outcome; an uncontrollable urge for an arms race coupled with dicey strategies that further undermine thresholds of deterrence. New Delhi claims that conventional warfighting may not be detrimental to nuclear deterrence but use of dual-capable platforms and frequent increase in crisis intensity suggest otherwise. The Indian Prime Minister’s insistence on coercive bargaining have yet to yield any results but its application surely puts nuclear deterrence close to tipping point. Just as India has always maintained that Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons will be met with a strategic response, New Delhi’s ambiguous deployment of dual-capable platforms communicates the same to Islamabad. For Prime Minister Nirendra Modi, playing the ‘Nixonian madman’ is neither a prudent choice nor a fruitful outcome. For New Delhi, massive arms acquisitions and short but fierce crises resulting into loss of equipment may not be a surmountable obstacle.
Can Pakistan resist escalation? Choosing between existential deterrence and limited warfighting
Pakistan continues to maintain a first strike posture owing to its geostrategic outlook and force posture and it still maintains offensive-defense against India. The challenge for Islamabad, however, is playing the restraint for so long that it compromises its ability to abide by its own thresholds. Operation Sindoor did manifest Indian ability to target certain locations inside Pakistan; an opportunity New Delhi may not miss in the next round if there ever was one. It also puts a question on Pakistan’s strategic choices amid dual-capable platforms in identifying when their use crosses over from conventional to nonconventional. This ambiguity also posits the risk of restraining to a point of compromise; challenging its deterrence-by-denial and also upsetting the conventional-nuclear equation of the region. Thomas Schelling’s views on ‘manipulation of risk’ where a bound status quo may not endure but would still be desirable is what Islamabad is staring directly into. e In this scenario, a first strike becomes not only an anticipated choice but also a compulsive reaction. Either way, India’s insistence on conventional warfighting not undermining nuclear thresholds is mythical at best. The use of loitering munitions and drone strikes may provide a shock value below any serious thresholds but using weapons capable of carrying nuclear payloads is another matter entirely. Even if such systems carry conventional payloads, it still undermines deterrence by hampering the adversary’s ability to distinguish between strikes. Such an outcome either paves the way for inadvertent escalation or an all-out MAD equation; neither of them being a desired outcome. Pakistan may definitely tolerate loitering munitions and drone targeting as a new normal and may even be preparing for countermeasures but for Islamabad, Agni and BrahMos would still be steps in the wrong direction.
How will the next round pan out in South Asia? Understanding the future of nuclear deterrence
Bluffing through use of dual capable platforms is often cited as a Cold War strategy; one that quickly lost its glamor after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The inability to distinguish between a conventional versus a nuclear payload is a bluff with unimaginable consequences. New Delhi’s gambit far exceeds its intended results and its repercussions were clearly understood by the US when it decided to mediate post-Sindoor. In the absence of arms limitation agreements and risk reduction mechanisms, offering such a strategic choice not only undermines credibility of deterrence but also accelerates escalation from conventional responses to unconventional outcomes. Even if Islamabad duplicates the same under its Full Spectrum Deterrence, it still runs the risk of unpredictable amendments to New Delhi’s force posturing. Nuclear deterrence does appreciate unpredictability but not on absolute terms and not in an environment where conventional-nuclear integration is being mistranslated. A scenario where conventionally equipped Agni or BrahMos is used against Pakistan, likely outcomes would be intensively detrimental to strategic stability. The strategy to coerce a strategic measure by Pakistan is not New Delhi’s best choice and resisting the temptation to escalate is not Islamabad’s perpetual position. For South Asia, in the absence of bilateral arms limitation treaties and/or risk reduction mechanisms, designing such strategies and employing such weapon systems implores third-party intervention to prevent unimaginable outcomes. An inability to distinguish between vital strategic targets is not South Asia’s problem and sufficient mechanisms are in place to prevent such a possibility. An inability to distinguish between nature of threat, however, is a new domain for both states. The issue then would not be targets selected or quantum of the ‘measured’ response but how such an undertaking was executed. For Pakistan, Agni and BrahMos will continue to remain dual-capable platforms capable of carrying nuclear payloads and this reality cannot be substituted by any reassurance of their conventional role in warfighting. New Delhi’s insistence on using such platforms may trigger a response that posits unimaginable costs to its security in particular and South Asian nuclear deterrence in general. Ever since the Uri and Pathankot incidents, PM Modi’s ‘surgical strikes’ are closest India can get to achieve coercive bargaining against Pakistan. The best outcome India could get from this was Pakistan’s willingness to cooperate on some terms towards transnational terrorism; a situation Pakistan already offers without any need for coercion. Furthering the ‘escalate to deescalate’ by introducing dual-capable platforms under purely conventional warfighting tactics seeks to reverse any gains. What it does is the opposite; it allows Pakistan to counter-escalate and what follows next is exactly the post-crisis environment we see today. New Delhi’s continued insistence on total ambiguity would increase chances of inadvertent actions and may not yield similar results as it got from the Mian Channu incident.
The author is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore and author of the book titled ‘Escalation Patterns in South Asia: Future of Credible Minimum Deterrence’.
