The Doval Doctrine: A Critical Analysis

The “Doval doctrine” is the key analytical lens on India’s national security posture in South Asian strategic studies since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, came to power in 2014. The doctrine got its name from Ajit Doval, a former Director of the Intelligence Bureau who was appointed National Security Advisor in 2014, and reflects a pivotal paradigm shift. India followed a broadly defined “strategic restraint” policy, meaning it was prepared to absorb sub-conventional provocation, especially from Pakistan, without taking overt, escalatory military action for decades. Decades ago, India followed a broadly defined “strategic restraint” policy, meaning it was prepared to absorb sub-conventional provocation, especially from Pakistan, without taking overt, escalatory military action. The Doval Doctrine undermines this restraint by establishing a new doctrine of “defensive offense” and proactive intervention.

This change came as part of a broader trend. It emerged in a domestic political landscape where the Hindu nationalist vision is gaining ascendancy, and national security narratives are inextricably linked to domestic political legitimacy (Ganguly 2020). Under the Modi government, the state has used muscular security responses as a tool of domestic political consolidation, thereby changing the security state’s calculus and deterrence on the subcontinent. The doctrine is crucial to strategic stability in South Asia. The strike was done in response to deliberate provocation, testing the nuclear thresholds set by Pakistan, with India openly committing to launching punitive strikes on either side of the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border, adding to the unpredictable nature of the region’s crisis dynamics. Doval Doctrine is not merely a rhetorical shift but a systemic, possibly revisionist, reorientation of India’s strategic approach. It effectively demonstrates political will and brings offensive-defensive cooperation to fruition. Still, it can also shorten the time to crisis, encourage arms races, and lead to uncontrolled escalation, ultimately undermining the South Asian security architecture.

The contours of the Doval Doctrine.

The Doval Doctrine is not a single, published white paper, but is assembled from Doval’s public speeches, his strategic writings, and the apparent operational styles of the Indian security establishment from 2014 onwards. The doctrine is an offensive strategy that rejects very defensive positions. In a widely quoted address at SASTRA University before taking over as NSA, Doval made it clear that such a defensive approach could not work, and that Pakistan would lose Balochistan if it did one Mumbai. In a famous address before he took over as NSA, Doval spoke about the limits of defense strategies and cautioned Pakistan: “You may do one Mumbai; you may lose Balochistan” (Doval, 2014). This encapsulated the idea of punitive retaliation and deterrence through punishment.

“If they go for us, we go for them, and if they use the weapons that they use, we fight with our weapons.” — Ajit Doval (2014)

The doctrine has the following strategic features:

Defensive Offense & the Double Squeeze Strategy: This is the process of stifling threats at their source or before they enter Indian Territory. The “double squeeze” suggests imposing conventional military pressure and sub-conventional and/or internal destabilizing pressure on opponents.

Coercive Diplomacy and Strategic Signaling: Use of warfare combined with diplomatic isolation to force adversaries to comply, with a high tolerance for risk.

Under the Nuclear Overhang doctrine, Limited War is based on the theory that the Pakistani nuclear umbrella is a bluff, which can be called. It aims to create space for conventional and sub-conventional war without reaching the nuclear level (Narang 2019).

Intelligence-Led and Covert Operations: This emphasizes going beyond traditional military formations, placing a high importance on intelligence fusion, cyber warfare, and special operations forces to achieve strategic objectives with plausible deniability.

Table 1 summarizes the features and operational logic of the Doval doctrine.

The features and operational logic of the Doval doctrine.

Reflections in Indian Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and State Behavior

Since 2014, Doval’s vision and planning have shaped Indian foreign policy, defense modernization, and crisis management.

Foreign Policy

Indian foreign policy has shifted from non-alignment to multi-alignment, adopting a hardline approach in the immediate neighborhood. Pakistan’s policy has shifted to a coercive approach aimed at regionally isolating Islamabad within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework. At the same time, India has moved from strategic restraint to strategic balancing (Ladwig 2023) through the QUAD and the wider Indo-Pacific security initiative, seeking to counter China.

Defense Policy & Modernization

Implementing the doctrine requires substantial financial and structural investment. India has rapidly accelerated militarization, modernization, and the strengthening of intelligence and cyber components in defense policy. This trend is reflected in data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which indicates that in 2025, India would be the fifth-largest military spender, spending $5.7 billion. That’s up 8.9 percent from the year before, to $92.1 billion. Pakistan’s spending increased by 11 percent to $11.9 billion, suggesting a reactive arms race (SIPRI 2026).

State Behavior and Major Crises

The doctrine is best grounded in state behavior. Both the 2016 “Surgical Strikes” and the 2019 airstrikes in Balakot vividly illustrated the shift towards cross-border retaliation.  Internally, the doctrine’s emphasis on internal security consolidation took effect when Article 370 of the Constitution of India was withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, amid criticism of serious human rights violations (HRW, 2019). In addition, the standoffs with China at Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) showed a greater readiness to take physical action to secure territorial rights. More recently, there have been verified and widely reported incidents of extraterritorial covert activities, including alleged plans to assassinate Sikh separatists in Canada and the United States in 2023-2024. Propose a possible expansion in the doctrine’s scope (Reuters 2024). The Indian government has repeatedly denied any formal role in this, but strategists have pointed out that it fits well with the rationale of defensive offense.

Revisionist Signs in the Doval Doctrine.

A crucial analytical challenge is whether the Doval Doctrine is revisionist state behavior or an aggressive defense of the status quo. According to classical realism and offensive realism, the more powerful a state becomes, the greater its strategic interests, and the more likely it is to feel compelled to become the regional hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001). The Doval Doctrine contains revisionist elements such as a quest for total regional supremacy, active force projection, and a willingness to overlook existing deterrence levels. However, the nuclear signaling has changed. There have been statements from key Indian officials that have created ambiguity in the country’s traditional policy of ‘no first use’ (NFU) regarding the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, which has raised the possibility of preemptive ‘counterforce’ strikes (Clary and Narang 2019). The message is clear: it implies a complete policy shift from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment, thereby worsening the security dilemma in the region. However, counterarguments argue that such a move isn’t revisionism to ‘seize land’ but rather a ‘coercive adaptation’ to try to rebuild deterrence from state-sponsored terrorism.

Destabilization in South Asia and the Wider Region

Moreover, the realization of the Doval Doctrine has clearly added to the acute crisis and instability in South Asia. In raising Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, India has automatically increased the possibility of catastrophic escalation. The Stimson Center has reported that after the Balakot crisis, leaders were seeking off-ramps, while technological developments and public nationalism are dramatically reducing decision-making time (Stimson Center 2020).

Timeline of major security crises 2016-2025

The doctrine has created an arms race dynamic, with both sides building up counterforce programs, ballistic missile defenses, and tactical nukes. It is highly relevant to the concept of “wormhole escalation,” in which, in the local context, sub-conventional triggers quickly cross conventional thresholds, threatening strategic stability (Hersman 2020). Moreover, the doctrine has also downplayed the importance of regional diplomatic initiatives such as SAARC and made bilateral Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) less effective.

Impact on India’s International Reputation

India, having historically developed a stance of being a “responsible rising power”, was seen as a champion of non-alignment, normative restraint, and institutional diplomacy. The Doval Doctrine has marred this, especially in recent years. The democratic backsliding and restrictions on civil liberties that have followed a heavy-handed security approach in Kashmir post-Article 370 have been documented extensively by human rights organizations (HRW 2019). Diplomatic challenges have emerged as the world’s harshest test, with allegations of transnational repression. Canadian and U.S. authorities have accused Indian intelligence of involvement in the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada and an aborted assassination attempt on Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York in late 2023 and 2024, respectively (Reuters 2024). Despite the establishment of an inquiry committee into the U.S. allegations, the diplomatic shock has led Western governments and international media to wonder whether India is becoming an “assertive security state,” one not bound by international norms. Domestic consumption sees these acts (if real) as “self-defense,” but foreign consumption sees “normative erosion.

Case Studies:

Surgical Strikes (2016)

In response to the terror attack in Uri, Indian Special Forces crossed the LoC to remove militant launch pads. The goal was to “tactically disrupt” and “strategically message.” It told home audiences that the days of passivity were behind them, and it told them that it would not escalate, but it said: “There is a way for ground forces to escalate, and that is through shallow raids. It told home audiences that the days of passivity were behind them, and it told them that it would not escalate, but it said: “There is a way for ground forces to escalate, and that is through shallow raids. This was the first time that defensive offense was put to the test.

Balakot (2019)

Indian Mirage 2000s targeted an alleged Jaish-e-Mohammed base in Balakot, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in reaction to the suicide attack on the army camp in Pulwama. This was a major psychological and strategic breakthrough in the use of airpower across an international border. Balakot broke the taboo surrounding the fact that Pakistan had no interest in allowing the Indians any conventional retaliation because of its nuclear umbrella. However, the next aerial dogfight and capture of an Indian pilot brought to light the very acute escalation of dangers and the need for third-party involvement (or luck) to find off-ramps (Tarapore 2020).

Operation Sindoor (2025)

After a serious terror attack in Pahalgam, Indian Air Force units used precision-guided standoff weapons (SCALP cruise missiles) fired from Indian airspace to target infrastructure deep in Pakistan. This operation marked a new evolution in the Doval Doctrine: seeking punitive outcomes while minimizing the risk of asset capture (as in Balakot). India characterized the strikes as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” but Pakistan saw them as an act of war, with its own technological intricacies on the escalation ladder (CSIS 2025).

A comparison of cross-border operations.

Critical Evaluation

The Doval Doctrine has resulted in polarized views in the strategic community. Proponents of the Doctrine say strategic restraint has proved ineffective in curbing Pakistani sub-conventional proxy warfare. By operationalizing the Doval Doctrine, India has regained credibility in its military threats, appeased domestic expectations of robust governance, and prompted adversaries to reconsider sponsoring terror. The nuclear threshold was not crossed in 2016, 2019, or 2025, which is why supporters have noted that it has not been reached despite Doval’s claims that he had crossed it. However, opponents argue there are “significant long-term implications. The doctrine rests on a ‘dangerous illusion of escalation control,’ scholars note. The geographical, temporal, and doctrinal factors in South Asia make ‘controlled’ punishment a potential ‘uncontrolled’ war. In addition, the doctrine is strategically overreaching. Extraterritorial actions could push away key Western partners, crucial to balancing China. The doctrine is a punishment, but so far, it has not achieved lasting change in adversary behavior, with a constant sequence of strategic engagements that never ends.

Conclusion

The Doval Doctrine marks a paradigm shift in how India engages in strategic action, moving from an absorption-and-restraint paradigm to a preemption, defensive offense, and assertive risk-taking approach. It is a synthesis of the thinking of older Indian strategic thinkers, in which the concept of limited wars, discussed since the Kargil War, is given a new lease of life; the operationalisation of such ideas, it is done with newfound political backing and aggressive intent. The evidence indicates revisionist tendencies within the doctrine. India is trying to rewrite the rules of engagement in South Asia by trying to achieve escalation dominance and openly pushing the nuclear-armed neighbors to the brink. In the future, the geopolitical implications in the Indo-Pacific are complex. A more capable and assertive India is a bulwark against Chinese hegemony. Still, such tactical unpredictability, as reflected in the crises from Balakot to Operation Sindoor, has always been the risk of accidental escalation of the nuclear arms race. To maintain strategic stability in the region, South Asia must build viable crisis communication structures and arms control regimes that can cope with the aggressive contours of this new strategic reality.

Author: M. Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.